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COMMENT.
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF LAWS REGULATING HOURS OF EMPLOYMENT.
The constant exercise, in an ever-varying sphere, of the State's
police power, by its law-making body for uses of public interest and
public welfare has been marked during the generation just passed.
And in no branch of this important and present-day subject has
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this so-called assumption of paternalism been, perhaps, so wide-
spread as in the enactment of laws to better the condition of the
employed by regulating their mode of labor in many ways. How-
ever humanitarian may have been the legislative motives in thisrespect, it is certain that the courts have been vastly divided in
their reception of these enactments. The difference of opinion
between the authorities has been especially wide when the con-
stitutionality of laws intended to shorten the hours of work for
those engaged in unhealthy and hazardous occupations, has been
at stake. Nor does the present trend of judicial decision bear
toward reconciliation on this point, which, because of the presentrivalry between capital and labor, is of great interest and impor-
tance.
In view of the added safeguard thrown around the liberty of
contract by Article I of the 14th Amendment to the Federal Con-stitution, many courts have held such statutes to be unconsti-
tutional, because "abridging the privileges and immunities of
American citizens" and authorizing "the taking of property without
due process of law." The Supreme Court of Illinois, in a case
decided in 1895, held that a statute prohibiting the employment otfemales for more than eight hours a day was unconstitutional,
both as special legislation and as violating the right to contractfor labor. It was then said that "when an owner is deprived of
one of the attributes of property, like the right to make contracts,
he is deprived of his property within the meaning of the Consti-
tution." Ritchie s,. People, 150 Ill. 98. Closeh following this de-
cision, in the same State, a provision in a contract between a city
and a contractor on public work that laborers should not be em-ployed for more than eight hours a day, was held to be invalid.
Fiske v. People, 188 Ili. 205. Also Treat v. People, 195 Ill. 196;
McChesney v. People, 200 II. 146; and more recently Glover v.
People, 66 N. E. Rep. 820. And in Colorado, Chief Justice Camp-
bell. in a most lucid opinion, declared that an act regulating thehours of employment in mines and smelters was void as an un-
warrantable exercise of the State's police power. He quoted with
approval a dictum of Judge Christiancy in People v. Jackson &
M. Plank Road Co., 9 _Mich. 285: "Powers which can only be jus-
tified on this specific ground (that of police regulation) and which
otherwise would have been prohibited by the constitution canbe such only as are so clearly necessary to the safety, comfort and
well-being of society or so imperatively required by the public
necessity as to lead to the rational conclusion that the framers
of the constitution could not, as men of ordinary prudence and
foresight. have intended to prohibit their exercise." In re Mor-gal, 58 Pac. io7i; also In re Eight Hour Law. 21 Col. 29. A
statute which provided that for all classes of laborers except those
employed in farm and domestic work, a working day should notexceed eight hours, was also held to be unconstitutional. Low
v. Rees Printing Co., 41 Neb. 127. The courts of Ohio and Cali-
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fornia have also approved these decisions. In the former State, an
act limiting the number of hours on public work to eight hours per
diem was held invalid; in the latter, a city ordinance to the same
effect was disapproved. Ex parte Kuback, 85 Cal. 274; Cleve-
land v. Clements Bros. Const. Co., 65 N. E. 885. Both of these
decisions were based on the violation of the provisions of the i 4 th
amendment.
The New York Court of Appeals, in the case of People v.
Orange County Road Const. Co., (decided on April ist, 19o3, and
not yet officially reported), have also taken the same stand. In
that case, contractors working under a contract with the County
were indicted for the violation of an eight hour statute. This
law was held to be unconstitutional, by the court of last resort,
as a police regulation which had no relation to the public morals,
the public health or the public safety, on any of which grounds it
might have been sustained. The court was of the opinion that the
State should not attempt to draw a line between itself and other
employers. When the public work is done by the State itself, it
may prescribe the manner of its prosecution, but when it is sub-let
to contractors, the government of their employees should be left
to them, in the absence of contract stipulations. This would
seem to bear out the case of United States v. Martin, 94 U. S. 400.
where, under an act of Congress, it was decided that the United
States might regulate the hours of its servants, as the statute was
merely declaratory between principal -and agent.
On the other hand, an array of authorities not less worthy of
consideration has affirmed the constitutionality of such legislative
acts. The Supreme Court of Utah has twice upheld a statute
regulating the hours of employment in mines and smelters, sim-
ilar to that criticized by li re Mforgan, supra. Stite- v. Holden,
14 Utah 7i: Short V. Mining Co., 57 Pac. Rep. 720. On appeal,
the first of these cases reached the Supreme Court of the United
States. where a divided bench confirmed the State decision. On
delivering the majority opinion. Mr. justice Brown said: "The
right to contract is itself subject to certain limitations which the
State may impose in the exercise of its police powers * * *
Where thie public health demands that one party to the contract
shall be protected against himself, the State still retains an interest
in his welfare, however reckless he may be." Holden v. Hardy,
169 U. S. 366. While the Supreme Court did not criticize the
State authorities which denied the validity of time laws of this
character. its dicta may be relied upon, perhaps, to show that the
highest court of the land regards these acts as valid exercises of the
police power. It may be worthy of note that Mr. justice Peckham,
whoqe contributions to the "Doctrine of Constitutional Protection
of Liberty of Contract" have been extensive, dissented from the
majority of the court. But, undoubtedly. the Utah statute here
involved could be supported on another ground, for the constitution
of that State especially gave the legislature power to pass acts
5or
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for the regulation of those employed in mines and smelters.Cons. Utah., Art. I6, Sec. 6. In the absence of constitutional pro-vision, the Supreme Court of Kansas affirmed the validity of ageneral eight hour law limiting the time of State municipal andcounty employees. In re Dalton, 61 Kan. 257. And a city ordi-nance forbidding public contractors to accept more than eighthours of daily labor has been supported. People v. Beck, 30 N.Y. Supp. 473. All of these laws and ordinances have been con-sidered justifiable under the vague police power of the State.But while eight hour laws have met with a varied receptionin the different courts, ten hour laws, perhaps because they aremore reasonable limitations, and perhaps because they have usuallybeen applied to employment in which the public has a well-ascer-tained interest, have been adjudged constitutional. Thus a ten hourlaw regulating the time of railroad employees has been supported.People v. Phyfe, 136 N. Y., 354. So. the validity of a similaract applied to employees of bakeries has been affirmed. Peo-ple v. Lochner, 73 App. Div. (N. Y.) 121. Perhaps the latestcontribution to judicial literature on this point is the majorityopinion of the justices of the Supreme Court of Rhode Island up-holding a statute limiting the hours of employees on trolley rail-ways. In re Ten Hour Law for Strect Rail-way Corp orations, 54
Ati. Rep. 602.
Though our courts have been loath to define the p::.lice powverwhich can over-ride private interests at legislative will, with any,approach to clearness, it is patent from all authorities, that policeregulations can only be valid on one of the three well-knowi groundsof public health, public safety or public morals. And all thedecisions agree that laws which seek to regulate hours of employ-ment are interferences with contractual liberty, which can only besupported because public interests demand their passage. So anapparently unreconcilible conflict resolves itself into the question otfact: Ts the employment sought to be regulated such an one thatits exercise affects the public at large to a degree where the in-terference may be justified under the police power?
THE UNION LABEL ON CITY PRINTING.
An interesting case affecting the power of labor unions wasrecently handed down by the Supreme Court of Tennessee. TheCourt held that an ordinance of a municipal corporation requir-ing all public printing to bear the union label was in violationof the National Constitution and of the constitution of the Stateof Tennessee, as well as against public policy.
The case referred to is that of Marshall & Bruce Co. v. Cityof Nashville, 71 S. W. 815. The charter of the city of Nashvillerequires that goods furnished the city shall be supplied by thelowest responsible bidder. The city authorities accepted a petition
502
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from a local typographical union and passed an ordinance that
"all city printing shall bear the union label." The authorities
thereafter advertised for bidders on a certain job of printing,
specifying therein the use of the union label. The complainant
was the lowest bidder. It appeared, however, that his specifi-
cations omitted all mention of the union label imprint. The city
notified him, after he had manufactured all the items specified
and made delivery of part, that it would refuse to receive the
printed material because of the absence of the union label; and
the work was re-let to a union printer. Thereupon the com-
plainant brought a bill for recovery of contract price of sta-
tionery furnished and printed. The chancellor held the ordinance
null and void because in conflict with the city charter requiring
goods to be supplied by the lowest bidder. The city appealed on
the questions, (i) whether the city had power to pass the ordi-
nance, and (2) whether, if the ordinance was void, the com-
plainant by responding to the advertisement specifying the union
label was not estopped from recovery because of his non-com-
pliance with its requirements.
The Court unanimously held the ordinance void, citing par-
ticularly among other decisions in support of its position, Holden
V. City of Alton. 179 Il 318; City of Atlanta v. Stein, 36 S. E. 932;
and Adams v. Brenan, 42 L. R. A. 718. In the latter case it was
said, "Even if the provision had been inserted pursuant to an
act of the legislature it would be void.; * * * it would be
an infringement upon the constitutional right of a citizen, and
tended to create a monopoly, and restrict competition in bidding
for work. The contract was in effect an expenditure of public
money for the benefit of a private organization or labor union."
In Fiske v. People, 58 N. E. 985, also cited, passing upon an
ordinance in Chicago requiring bidders upon public work to use
only union labor, such ordinance was declared to be void as dis-
crinzinating between different classes of citizens, and as restricting
competition and increasing the cost of public work. In Adams
v. Brenan, supra, it was said: "There is no more reason or jus-
tification for such a contract as this than there would be for a
provision that no one should be employed except members of some
particular party or church."
In Holden v. City of Alton, supra, the leading union label case,
it was said: "The council cast upon the tax payers an increased
burden * * * solely because it had entered into a combina-
tion with a certain class of persons doing printing to restrict the
privilege of bidding to such class, instead of leaving it open to
all citizens, upon like conditions. Such a combination or agree-
ment is in violation of common right, tends to create a monopoly,
and cannot be tolerated."
The court made short work of the suggestion that the non-
union citizen is not deprived of the right to contract to perform
the city's work, because he may join the union. "So any man
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could become a Democrat, a Presbyterian or Catholic * * but
he is not compelled to do this."
The majority of the court held that the bidder by making
no stipulation in his bid was authorized to ignore the provisions
of the advertisement, as to the union label, and refuse to comply
therewith in furnishing the goods; also, that it would be presumed
that he knew the provision invalid; that no restriction in bidding
resulted therefrom; and that a contract awarded to the lowest
bidder was binding on the city. It would seem, however, that
the dissenting judges stand on better legal and logical ground.
The minority would have declared the contract made under the
rule requiring the union label wholly void. Memphis v. Gas Co.,
9 Heisk. 532. They say, "The provision of the charter relating to
me letting of contracts is mandatory and controlling, and the bid-
ding. not having in our opinion been open to free and unrestricted
competition, was illegal and gave no right and imposed no lia-
bility, even though fully performed by either party. San FranciscoV. Eroderick, 57 r'ac. 867 * *" :.- The er-quirememF in-
serted in the advertisement for sealed bids, containing provision
that the work should bear the. union label, was calculated to deler
free and competitive bidding. See 2o Am, and Eng. Enc. Law, 2nd
ed. ,i 66.)
The whole question shades into the points raised by the Eight
Hour Law cases elsewhere commented upon in this issue, It in-
volves the entire doctrine of free contract and the illegality of
restrictions thereof The insistence that public printing shall bear
the union label, tends, unquestionably to restriction of competition
discrimination in favor of a particular class and to increase of tlic
burden of the taxp.:ye, r. evI'f if hig h. tribunals should not concur
v, in il-i Tennessee Court in holding such contracts in violation
of the 14th Amendment to the Federal Constitution.
COMP IULSORY VACCINATION.
Statutes requiring vaccination are now to be found upon the
s-tatute-hooks of mo't. if not all, of the States. The earlier statutes
generally related solely to school children, making vaccination a
prerequisite to attendance: and have uniformly been held to be
c,:nstitutional on the general ground that atlendance upon schools
is t privilege afforded by the State, rather than a technical right
of the citizen, and that the State may impose reasonable conditions
upon those availing themselves of such privilege. Bissell v. David-
son, 65 Conn. 183; Duffeld v. School District, 162 Pa. St. 476.
Yet the courts have usually considered this power to be restrictcd to
the legislature and have denied its exercise by health and school
boards, when acting, not under express legislative authority, but
by reason of their general power "to supervise" health and schools
and "make reasonable rules and regulations therefor." Osborn v.
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Russell, 68 Pac. 6o (Kan. 19o2) ; Matthews v. Board of Education,
127 Mich. 530; In re Smith, 146 N. Y. 68.
In more recent years the legislatures have gone further and
enacted statutes requiring in certain exigencies, vaccination on the
part of 'all persons in the community. The Massachusetts statute,
which is similar to that of Connecticut and many other States, is
as follows: "The board of health of a city or town, if in its dis-
cretion it is necessary for the public health or safety, shall require
and enforce the vaccination and re-vaccination of all the inhabi-
tants thereof, and shall provide them with the means of free vac-
cination. Whoever, being over twenty-one years of age, and not
under guardianship, refuses or neglects to comply with such re-
quirements, shall forfeit five dollars." Rev. Laws, Mass., c. 75,
Section 137.
Under authority of this statute, the board of health of Cam-
bridge, in I9O2, reciting that small-pox was prevalent to some
extent in the city, ordered all the inhabitants who had not been
successfully vaccinated since Mar. I, 1897, to be vaccinated or re-
vaccinated. Certain of the inhabitants refused and were tried
and convicted. On appeal, the Supreme judicial Court of Massa-
chusetts affirmed the conviction and declared the statute to be
constitutional. Commonwealth v. Pear, 66 N. E. 719.
In reaching this conclusion, the court followed the cases of
Morris v. Columbus, 102 Ga. 792, and State v. Hay, 126 N. C. 999.
The opinion is based on the general police power and in analogy
to the decisions in the school children's cases, the court failing to
make the distinction that in these a privilege only is denied for
non-compliance, while in the principal case, there is a penalty by
fine. This point was met by the first case to consider the ques-
tion, Morris v. Columbus, supra, the court there denying the valid-
ity of the distinction, saying, "True, the child may avoid the conse-
quences of the resolution by not entering school;,and so the citi-
zen may avoid the consequences of a municipal regulation by put-
ting himself beyond the jurisdiction of the municipality." Whether
or not this disposes of the question may be doubted, but the courts
have found a broader ground on which to uphold the legislation,
that if a statute be enacted to promote the general welfare, whether
it be for the good of the community is a legislative, and not a
judicial, question.
It would seem, therefore, that as long as the opponents of vac-
cination are confronted by the testimony in its favor, of a large
number of prominent physicians, they cannot look to the courts
to set aside the legislation; for as Tiedeman, on the Police Power,
P. 39, remarks: "This expert testimony may be erroneous, as ex-
pert testimony often is; but its unreliability must be proven to the
courts, in order to successfully resist the enforcement of vaccination
laws." But the Massachusetts court denies even the force of such
an argument, saying: "If the defendant had been permitted to
introduce such expert testimony * * it would not have justi-
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fled the court in holding that the Legislature had transcended its
power in enacting this statute on their judgment of what the
welfare of the people demands."
The opposition to vaccination, which manifested itself in
Montreal, Canada, during the winter of 1885-86, in riots against
the enforcement of a compulsory law, and that later led to the
adoption in England of a law making it optional (1898) and is now
seen in the growth of the Anti-Vaccination League in this country,
must apparently confine its efforts to the legislature, for no court
as yet has given weight to its contentions.
